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3 1. Introduction
The successive financial crises in emerging economies during the last decade
have been to a great extent different from those preceding them (Bustelo, 2000).
However, they have also displayed significant common features. To analyze
their similarities and differences is therefore a pertinent endeavor.
Furthermore, this kind of comparative analysis is also helpful in order to
prevent future crises. Some studies (Eichengreen, 2002; Desai, 2003) have
analyzed financial crises with the aim of obtaining possible conclusions on
national and international measures directed to prevent their recurrence.
It is then extremely appealing to compare the East Asian crises in 1997-98
with the  Argentinean crisis in 2001-02, but the comparison has attracted so far
only a very limited amount of research (see, for instance, Bustelo, 2002; Rajan,
2002). This lack of interest is even more surprising if we take into account the
large literature which has compared the Mexican crisis in 1994-95 with the East
Asian crises (Kregel, 1998; Palma, 1998; Esquivel and Larraín, 1999; Palma, 2000;
Chang and Velasco, 2001; Nishijima, 2002; Olivié, 2002; Varela and Jacobs, eds.,
2002).
Besides, the comparison between the East Asian crises and the Argentinean
crisis has an additional interest, due to the fact that the latter has been subjected
to simplistic analyses. For instance, it has been suggested that Argentina’s crisis
was the result of the incompatibility between a too expansive fiscal policy and a
too rigid exchange rate regime, and that the crisis was therefore a first
generation type of crisis, and as such an unavoidable and predictable crisis.
Insofar as the East Asian crises have been defined as second generation crises1
or even third generation crises2, the differences between them would be so great
that they would not allow for a sensible comparison. The arguments that will be
laid out in this paper are that Argentina’s crisis can not be defined as a first
                                                
1 That is, contingent or multiple equilibria crises, and which are the result of self-
fulfilling expectations, being therefore unpredictable.
2 It is however dubious that “real” third generation models already exist, despite the
shortcomings of second generation models.
4generation crisis and that it has displayed several important similarities with
the East Asian crises.
This article develops, updates and completes a previous work of the author
(Bustelo, 2002), written before Argentina’s default on its sovereign debt in early
2002.
2. The mechanisms of financial crises
The main financial crises in emerging economies during the last decade
(Mexico in 1994-95, East Asia in 1997-98, Turkey in 2000-01 and Argentina in
2001-02)3 have presented common mechanisms. One way to treat them is
through a simple theoretical framework like the one presented in García (2002)
and Olivié (2002), on the basis of the work of different authors.
All those crises were preceded by a considerable growth of capital inflows
(Palma, 2000) in a context of a nominal exchange rate which was softly pegged
(Mexico, East Asia and Turkey) or hardly pegged (Argentina). The main
reasons for the emerging economies to adopt this kind of anchored exchange-
rate regime were: (1) the will to fight inflation (Mexico since 1987, Argentina
since 1991 and Turkey since 1999) and/or (2) the desire to attract more foreign
capital (East Asia since the early 1990s). The anchor, in fact, allowed for an
exchange rate-based stabilization (of prices). Moreover, it eliminated or reduced
the perceived exchange risk, so it promoted capital inflows, particularly if the
peg was coupled with financial opening and with large differentials in interest
rates.
Two main transmission channels between capital inflows and a higher risk
of financial crisis might be distinguished.
On the one hand, as far as the current account is concerned, capital inflows,
especially if they are large and debt-generating, provoke a real appreciation of
the currency, a loss in competitiveness and a growing trade deficit, as well as an
                                                
3 The Brazilian crisis of 1999 might be understood as a crisis due to contagion from the
Asian crises.
5increase in payments in the investment income account. Both effects culminate
in a substantial increase in the current account deficit.
On the other hand, as regards to the financial account, capital inflows, as a
result of their important volume and of their structure (a bias towards debt
and/or volatile flows), promote: (1) a credit boom channeled to activities that
increase credit risk (that is, to investments that have a low profitability or that
are risky), exchange risk (to investments unhedged against an eventual
devaluation) and liquidity risk (to long-term investments)4; (2) an increase in
external debt, mainly with short-term maturities; and (3) a growing
vulnerability to an eventual reversal in capital flows. The emerging economies
undertaking structural reforms are then prone to display an “overborrowing
syndrome”, both internally and externally, as stressed in the well-known model
of McKinnon and Pill (1999).
The appreciated currency in a context of a high current account deficit, the
increase in risk as a result of the growing currency and maturity mismatches,
the accumulation of short-term external debt (especially respective to foreign
exchange reserves) and the larger dependence on potentially reversible capital
flows were factors which, all together, triggered speculative attacks against the
currencies. The herding behavior of investors resulted sometimes in a financial
panic.
Therefore, an adequate interpretation of financial crises is one which
combines a worsening in the state of some fundamentals with the speculative,
herd-like and panic-prone behavior of international financial markets. In short,
financial crises in emerging economies might be addressed to as liberalization
crises in the context of the current framework of financial globalization.
This theoretical approach allows to apprehend the common mechanisms of
financial crises. However, it does not pretend to understate that the differences
between the aforementioned crises were important in several areas, such as, at
                                                
4 This increase in risk was also due to a financial deregulation which was undertaken
without the simultaneous creation of a system of prudential supervision and regulation
of banks and non-bank financial institutions.
6first sight, the following:
· the exchange-rate policy previous to the crises: a soft peg in Mexico, Turkey
and East Asia and a hard peg in Argentina;
· monetary policy prior to the crises: expansive in Mexico, cautious in East
Asia, expansive in Turkey and restrictive in Argentina;
· the underlying process which triggered the crises: overconsumption in
Mexico, overinvestment in East Asia, overshooting of inflation in Turkey5
and “pure” indebtedness in Argentina;
· the structure of capital inflows: mainly portfolio investment in Mexico,
Turkey and Argentina, and mostly bank loans in East Asia;
· the composition of external debt: mainly public in Mexico, Turkey and
Argentina, and mostly private in East Asia.
3. The East Asian crises (1997-98)
The East Asian crises of 1997-98 affected mainly the so called Asia-5
economies (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and South Korea).
Although these crises can be understood in all cases as the result of
liberalization or under-regulation6, they were heterogeneous. For instance, in
the years preceding the outbreak of their respective crises, Thailand, Indonesia
and the Philippines displayed a significant currency real appreciation, but this
was not the case in Malaysia nor especially in South Korea. Moreover, neither
Indonesia or South Korea had a very large current account deficit in the two
years preceding 1997.
                                                
5 The overshooting of inflation in Turkey was a result of the decision of the authorities
to renounce to sterilization of capital inflows (that is, to the selling of government
bonds). As a result, the fall in interest rates was excessive and did not allow to fight
inflation sufficiently.
6 Contrary to the “orthodox” approach, which stated that the main culprit of the crises
was the excessive state intervention in a context of crony capitalism. For a critique of
that approach, see Jayasuriya and Rosser (2001).
7The underlying process which led to the Asian crisis is well-known and
might be summarized as follows (see more details in Bustelo, 1998 and Bustelo
et al., 1999 and 2000).
First, financial opening, together with the currency pegs to the US dollar and
with the low interest rates prevailing a the time in developed countries, led to
large capital inflows, mainly in the form of short-term bank loans.
On the one hand, this inflow provoked a real appreciation of the currency,
which was also due to the increase in the value of the US dollar since 19957 and
to significant differentials in inflation rates. Currency appreciation, along with
the growing competitive pressure from China and the fall in the prices of
electronic parts (such as semiconductors), led to a lower growth rate of exports
and, ultimately, to an increased current account deficit.
On the other hand, capital inflows contributed, together with financial
deregulation, to a credit boom which led to a bubble in the stock and property
markets and to an overinvestment in the manufacturing sector (Erturk, 2001).
Second, financial deregulation, without an appropriate system of prudential
supervision and regulation, was a main element which led to a situation of
growing financial fragility (Arestis y Glickman, 2002), as the  balance sheets of
the banking system worsened.
Credit assessments lost quality, external indebtedness (especially in short-
term liabilities) increased and the currency and maturity mismatches grew, as
financial intermediators contracted debts in foreign currency and in short-term
liabilities in order to invest in national currency and in long-term positions.
Third, foreign capital flows changed abruptly their course in 1997 and 1998.
According to IMF data, net capital inflows to Asia-5 decreased from US$ 69.8
billion in 1996 to minus 18.2 billion in 1997 and to minus 105.2 billion in 1998.
Table 1 includes some of the indicators of this process.
                                                
7 The US dollar appreciated nearly 50% respective to the yen between June 1995 and
April 1997.
8Table 1. Some macroeconomic indicators in East Asia before and
during the 1997-98 financial crises
Korea Philippines Indonesia Malaysia Thailand
NPCI/GDP (%)
1983-91 -0.4 -0.8 2.6 4.1 5.7
1992-96 3.2 4.8 4.8 10.5 8.8
RCA (%)
Dec94-Mar97 2 11 17 14 14
Dec90-Mar97 11 47 25 28 25
CAB/GDP (%)
1990-95 (average) -1.2 -3.7 -2.5 -5.8 -3.9
1996 -4.7 -4.7 -3.4 -5.0 -7.9
BCPS/GDP (%)
1990 52 19 45 71 64
1996 62 49 55 93 102
STED/R (%)
June 1994 1.62 0.40 1.72 0.25 0.99
June 1997 2.07 0.84 1.70 0.61 1.45
NPCI (US$ billion)
1996 23.8 11.2 10.8 4.3 19.4
1998 -77.2 0.4 -9.6 -4.7 -14.1
Notes: NPCI/GDP: net private capital inflows as a percentage of GDP; RCA:
real currency appreciation (in percentage); CAB/GDP: current account balance
as a percentage of GDP; BCPS/GDP: bank credit to the private sector as a
percentage of GDP; STED/R: short-term external debt respective to FX reserves;
NPCI: net private capital inflows (US$ billion).
Sources: BIS, IMF and Bustelo et al. (2000), several tables.
94. The Argentinean crisis (2001-02)
The default on sovereign debt in December 2001 and the abandonment of
the fixed exchange rate in January 2002 provoked, as it is very well known, a
full-blown financial crisis in Argentina. The peso depreciated more than 350%
in the nine first months of the year and the inflation rate reached 25.9% in 2002,
after three years (1999-2001) of deflation. The recession deepened: after having
fallen 4.4% in 2001, GDP collapsed 11% in 2002. Therefore, in 2002 GDP was
20% lower than in 1998 and the unemployment rate reached 18%. The current
account balance, after displaying a deficit in 2001 (-1.7% of GDP), turned into a
large surplus in 2002 (8.3% of GDP). Poverty and inequality increased and the
wounded productive sector will surely take several years to recover.
The causes of the Argentinean crisis have been extensively debated8. In
short, three main interpretations could be listed. The first one emphasizes the
incompatibility between the rigid exchange-rate regime and the imprudent
fiscal policies (Mussa, 2002), so that the crisis was, in fact, a first generation type
of crisis. The second explanation stresses the “sudden stop” in international
capital markets after the Russian crisis in August 1998 (Calvo et al., 2002). The
third explanation blames the inappropriate character of the exchange-rate
regime (Haussman and Velasco, 2002; Perry and Servén, 2003).
Haussman and Velasco (2002), among others, have criticized the thesis of
fiscal profligacy. Primary public expenditures remained virtually constant
(around 23-24% of GDP) between 1993 and 2001. The public deficit did not
reach relatively high levels until 1999 (4.2% of GDP) and as a consequence,
rather than as a cause, of the recession. The public primary balance was even
positive in 1997 and 1998. Public debt, despite growing significantly in absolute
terms (from US$ 86 billion in 1994 to 148 billion in 2000), did not reach a
percentage of GDP higher than, for instance, the upper limit in the Maastricht’s
                                                
8 An interesting survey of the factors of the crisis can be found in the articles of
Teunissen y Akkerman, eds. (2003).
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convergence criteria9. In short, “the fiscal imbalance that emerged was related
to the recession and hence is best understood as a consequence rather as a cause
of the crisis” (Haussman and Velasco, 2002: 13).
Perry and Servén (2003) have convincingly suggested that Argentina did not
suffer more than other Latin American countries from the contraction of
international capital markets since 1998; a contraction due to the shockwaves of
the East Asian and Russian crises. For instance, these authors point out that the
spread on Argentina’s sovereign debt did not surpass that of Brazil until 2000
and that the fall in gross capital inflows displayed the same tendency in
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico between mid-1998 and late 199910. Moreover, the
reduction in Argentina’s net capital inflow in 1999 respective to 1998 was mild
(it only decreased from 23.3 US$ billion in 1998 to 21.0 billion in 1999), mainly
because inward foreign direct investment triplicated its value.
Therefore, the origin of the Argentinean crisis has to be tracked to the
exchange rate-based stabilization program adopted in April 1991, with the
creation of a currency board. Argentina’s currency board was not actually
“orthodox”11, but it consisted mainly in establishing a fixed peso-dollar
exchange rate and in backing the bulk of circulating pesos with reserves in US
dollars.
For analytical purposes, the period which has to be observed is 1992-98, as
in 1999 the economy already entered recession. From 1999 onwards, data are
misleading, because, for instance, the relatively low level of the current account
deficit (4.2% of GDP in 1999 and 3.1% of GDP in 2000) was a consequence of an
abrupt fall in imports, induced by the recession.
                                                
9 Public debt increased from 29.5% of GDP in 1993 to 43.3% in 1998 and to 51.3% in
2000 (Baer et al., 2002: 10).
10 Perry y Servén (2003) also conclude that the fall in the terms of trade in 1998-99 and
the slowdown of the world economy in 2001 did not have a more pronounced impact
in Argentina than in other Latin American countries.
11 For instance, Argentina’s currency board could hold a maximum of one third of its
assets in government bonds and it acted temporarily (in the aftermath of the Mexican
crisis) as a lender of last resort. Moreover, the central bank kept a certain amount of
regulatory power over commercial banks, as it established their reserve ratios. See
Spiegel (2002).
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The hard peg had indeed some positive results in the case of Argentina.
First, it allowed for a substantial reduction in inflation, whose annual rate
decreased from 3,080% in 1989 and 2,314% in 1990 to 17.5% in 1992. The
inflation rate was lower than 4% since 1994 and lower than 1% since 1996.
Therefore, interest rates could decrease and the investment rate grew
significantly (gross domestic investment increased from 14% of GDP in 1990 to
17% in 1992 and to 21% in 1998).
Second, the peg made possible an increase in productivity, mainly in the
tradable goods sector, which contributed also to the growing external
competitiveness. The annual rate of change in total factor productivity, which
had been negative in the 1980s (-1%), reached 2.1% in 1991-98 (Kiguel, 2001: 10).
The main reason is that the imports of capital goods grew substantially in the
early 1990s.
Third, it regenerated financial intermediation, as both bank deposits and
loans increased their share in GDP: between 1991 and 1998, deposits increased
from 8% of GDP to 26%, while loans grew from 14% to 30% (De La Torre et al.,
2003: 32).
Finally, the disappearance of the exchange risk contributed to a sharp
growth in capital inflows in the form of foreign direct investment, which was
also a result of widespread privatizations of public firms and banks. Gross
foreign direct investment increased from US$ 1.8 billion in 1990 to 4.2 billion in
1996 and to 8.1 billion in 1997.
All the above factors contributed to a substantial growth of GDP (an annual
rate of 6.7% in 1991-97), although the expansion was erratic, partly as a result of
the Tequila effect in 1995 and partly as a consequence of the high vulnerability
to successive external shocks (the appreciation of the US dollar since 1995, the
fall in the terms of trade in 1998-99, the devaluation of the Brazilian real in 1999,
the depreciation of the euro in 2000 and the downturn in the world economy in
2001). As shown in figure 1, which compares Argentina’s GDP growth with that
of other big Latin American economies (Brazil, Chile and Mexico), the growth
rate of GDP was very high in 1991-94 (an annual average of 9.1%) and,  as a
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whole, more than respectable in 1991-98 (an annual average of 6.4%), especially
in comparison with all Latin America (4.3% in 1991-94 and  3.7% in 1991-98).
However, figure 1 also shows that growth was more unstable in Argentina than
in Chile, Brazil or even Mexico.
Figure 1. Annual growth rates of GDP in Argentina, Brazil, Chile
and Mexico, 1990-2000
Source: IMF.
Notwithstanding, as Perry and Servén (2003) highlighted, the unemployment
rate grew from 6.7% in 1990 to 15.5% in 1995, and later fell moderately to 11.3%
in 1998. Poverty, which decreased substantially in 1990-93, also increased
between 1994 and 1996 and remained constant thereafter and until 1999. Income
inequality, as measured by the Gini index, worsened significantly from 1995
onwards.
Besides, the Argentinean growth model in the 1990s aggravated the
deindustrialization that the country had been suffering since the 1980s.
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Industry, as a percentage of GDP, decreased from 36% in 1990 to 32% in 1999
and to 28% in 2000 (it had reached 40% in 1980).
Therefore, the macroeconomic evolution in Argentina between 1991 and 1998
displayed important positive features but also significant pitfalls.
Besides, it is well known that currency boards have several inconveniences
(see, for instance, García, 2003 and Maneiro, 2003). On the one hand, not only
they make it impossible to resort to exchange-rate policy, but also to counter-
cyclical monetary policy12, especially if the economy faces external shocks, such
as an increase in international interest rates, a fall in the terms of trade, a
reduction in capital inflows, an appreciation of the anchor currency or a
devaluation of the currency of an important trading partner. It should be
remembered that this is always the case, except if the fixed exchange rate is
coupled with restrictions to the free mobility of capital (through capital
controls). As it is very well known, according to the Mundell-Fleming theory of
the impossible trinity, it is not possible to have at the same time exchange rate
stability, free movement of capital and autonomy in monetary policy. On the
other hand, currency boards tend to provoke, unless they are backed by
substantial foreign exchange reserves or unless a rapid price adjustment follows
(arguably the case of Hong Kong since 1998), a chain of negative economic
processes, beginning with a real appreciation of the currency, due to
inflationary inertia and later to the eventual appreciation of the anchor currency
and/or the eventual devaluation of the currency of a major trading partner.
In Argentina, massive capital inflows were due to the disappearance of the
exchange risk and to interest-rate differentials but also to a very intense
financial opening (see the details in Penido and Prates, 2000) and to a massive
privatization of public companies and banks (Baer et al., 2002). According to
ECLAC data, net external financial resources grew from minus 3.1% of GDP in
1990 to 2.1% in 1995, to 4.9% in 1997 and to 5.8% in 1998. Net private capital
                                                
12 In particular, a currency board imposes a “ceiling” to the money supply and a
“floor” to the interest rates.
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inflows surged from minus US$ 203 million in 1990 to 14.5 billion in 1996 and to
18.9 billion in 1998.
This massive capital flows contributed to the unleashing of the two
aforementioned transmission channels of the risk to suffer a financial crisis.
On the current account side, currency real appreciation was substantial
during the whole period, as a result of inflationary inertia (inflation differentials
were positive until 1995), the higher value of the US dollar since the spring of
1995, the devaluation of the Brazilian real in January 1999 and the depreciation
of the euro in 2000. Alberola et al. (2003) estimate that real appreciation was
substantial between 1990 and 1993 (71%) and also from 1996 onwards, so in
2001 the peso had appreciated 80% respective to 1990. Figure 2 uses the
estimates of Alberola et al. (2003) but it presents the data using, as a base year,
1990, instead of the average of 1990-2001.
The appreciation in 1997-99 led to a slowdown in the growth of exports, as
shown also in figure 2.
Therefore, together with the worsening of the investment income account
(whose deficit increased from 1.8% of GDP in 1995 to 2.6% in 1998), the increase
of the trade deficit led to a larger current account deficit, which grew from 2.0%
of GDP in 1995 to 4.9% in 1998 (see figure 3).
As regards to the financial channel, capital inflows led to a credit boom, to a
larger external debt and to a higher vulnerability to a reversal in inflows.
15
Figure 2. Argentina: Real effective exchange rate (1990=100) and
annual growth rate of merchandise exports (in percentage), 1990-
2001.
Sources: Alberola et al. (2003) and Ministerio de Economía y Producción de la
República Argentina.
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Figure 3. Argentina: balances of the current account and of its
components (as a percentage of GDP), 1992-2001
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics, and Ministerio de Economía y
Producción de la República Argentina.
First, the credit boom has been analyzed by De La Torre et al. (2003), who
indicate that credit, as a share of GDP, more than doubled between 1991 and
1998 (from 14% to 30%). A large part of credit was channeled to the non-
tradables sector (for instance, consumer loans, mortgages and public debt), so
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firms was directed to activities which increased credit risk (to investments with
a low profitability or with a high profitability but risky), exchange risk (that is,
unhedged to an eventual devaluation)13 and liquidity risk (long-term
investments).
Second, the bulk of capital inflows was in the form of portfolio investment
(mainly in bonds), as shown in table 2. Between 1992 and 1998, Argentina
received a net amount of foreign capital of US$ 136.2 billion, of which 87.2
billion were portfolio investments (64%). Moreover, the bulk of portfolio
investment was directed to the purchase of bonds (US$ 74.5 billion, or 54.9% of
total capital inflows).
Table 2. Net capital inflows in Argentina, 1992-1998, US$ billion
and percentages
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1992-1998 %
FDI 4.3 2.7 3.6 5.6 6.9 9.1 7.2 39.8 29.2
PI 2.9 35.2 9.8 4.7 12.0 11.6 10.7 87.2 64.0
equity 1.1 4.9 3.1 1.1 0.9 1.4 -0.2 12.5 9.1
debt 1.7 30.3 6.7 3.6 11.1 10.2 10.9 74.4 54.9
OI 1.8 -18.8 3.5 7.1 1.9 8.2 5.3 9.2 6.8
Total 9.2 19.2 17.0 17.5 20.9 29.1 23.3 136.2 100.0
Notes: FDI: foreign direct investment; PI: portfolio investment; OI: other
investment.
Source: ECLAC.
                                                
13 The exchange risk existed despite financial dollarization (which increased, between
1992 and 1999, from 55% to 90% in credit to the public sector and from 50% to 60% in
credit to the private sector), as the bulk of credit was chanelled to the non-tradables
sector, that is, to a sector which was unable to hedge against this risk in terms of
tradable goods (De La Torre et al., 2003: 20).
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As a result, external debt increased from US$ 62.7 billion in 1992 (27% of
GDP) to 140.5 billion in 1998 (47% of GDP). As a proportion of exports of goods
and services, debt increased from 407% in 1992 to 457% in 1998 and to 523% in
1999. Debt service, as a share of exports of goods and services, grew from 22%
in 1993 to 64% in 1998. The high weight of foreign investment in government
bonds resulted in a large proportion of public debt in total debt, as shown in
table 3.
Table 3. External debt of Argentina, 1993-99, as a percentage of
GDP
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Public 23.4 24.7 26.0 27.0 25.5 27.6 30.0
Private 7.1 8.5 12.2 13.8 16.9 19.5 21.1
Total 30.5 33.2 38.2 40.3 42.5 47.1 51.1
Source: IMF.
It should be borne in mind that the fact that a large part of the external debt
was public does not imply that the public debt was excessive nor that the public
sector beared the sole responsibility of external indebtedness. Public debt
(which amounted to 43.3% of GDP in 1998 and to 50.3% in 1999)14 was not
substantially higher than that of all Latin American emerging economies (which
ranged between 40% and 45%, as an average, between 1990 and 1999).
Moreover, table 3 also shows that the growth of private external debt was very
significant.
The ratio between short-term external debt and foreign exchange reserves,
which was already high in June 1994 (1.3), reached 1.6 in December 1998 and 2.0
in June 2001. This indicated a high and growing liquidity risk.
                                                
14 Although most of the public debt was in foreign currency (more than 90%) and in
bonds (more than 70%), according to Baer et al., 2002: tables 6a and 6b.
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Third, between 1997 and 1998 net portfolio investment decreased from US$
10.7 billion to minus 4.8 billion. Total net capital inflows, after reaching a record
high of US$ 29.1 billion in 1997, diminished in 1998 and 1999 and contracted
abruptly in 2000 (12.6 billion) and in 2001 (minus 10.9 billion). The reversal
between 2000 and 2001, which amounted to more than 23.0 billion, was
equivalent to 8% of the GDP in 2000.
5. A comparative analysis
The comparative analysis between the East Asian crisis and the Argentinean
crisis can be carried out in two levels: a superficial one and a structural one.
The superficial comparison indicates that:
· the Asian crises were sudden and totally unexpected, while Argentina’s
crisis was in slow-motion and protracted, as well as perfectly expected from
at least 1999;
· the Asian crises displayed a great contagion effect, both regionally and
internationally, while this was not the case of the Argentinean crisis15,
because, among other factors, financial markets had already discounted that
the crisis was going to happen, and;
· the Asian crises were rapidly tackled by the IMF, which intervened quickly
in Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea, after the outbreak of their
respective crises; on the contrary, Argentina, although it obtained a stand-by
credit in March 2000 (which was increased in January and September 2001
to US$ 21.6 billion), did not receive a similar assistance just before and after
the default and the devaluation, perhaps as a result of the IMF’s concern at
the moment on the moral hazard effects of its rescue programs.
                                                
15 Despite serious effects on Uruguay and Paraguay. It should be remembered that the
Asian crises had an important capacity to transmit themselves not only in East Asia but
also in other emerging and transitional economies.
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The structural comparison might address both the mechanisms of the crises
and the underlying processes which led to them.
As regards to the mechanisms of the crises, some similarities and differences
can be pointed out.
On the one hand, the Asian crises and the Argentinean crisis presented
common features, in addition to the currency pegs: financial liberalization,
massive capital inflows, inadequate allocation of credit, substantial real
currency appreciation, high and growing current account deficits, large short-
term external debt and adverse effects from the speculative and herding
behavior of international capital markets.
Financial liberalization had in both cases two sides: financial opening and
financial deregulation. In fact, financial opening made possible the massive
capital inflows, while financial deregulation allowed for risky behaviors in the
financial sector.
The main factors behind capital inflows were similar: financial opening,
disappearance of the perceived exchange risk as a result of the pegs, and large
interest rate differentials.
Regarding the inadequate allocation of credit, it is known that in East Asia a
large part of credit was directed to investments in stocks and real estate, which
created an asset bubble. In Argentina, the banking sector financed consumer
credits and mortgages and made placements in the financing of the public
sector. If it had instead financed import-substituting or export-expansion
activities, the liquidity problems simply would not have appeared. As Perry
and Servén (2003: 50) point out, this sectoral allocation of credit was a result of
the fact that the regulatory system did not have enough control over credits to
the private non-tradables sector, or over banking finance of the public sector.
In the six years preceding their crises, currency real appreciation was 47% in
the Philippines, 28% in Malaysia, 25% both in Thailand and Indonesia and 11%
in South Korea (see again table 1) while it reached 26% in Argentina (Alberola et
al., 2003).
The factors behind the increase in the current account deficit were also
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similar: currency real appreciation, worsening of the investment income
account, a fall in the terms of trade (as a result of the decrease in
semiconductors’ prices in 1996 in East Asia and of the prices of non-oil primary
products in 1998-99 in Argentina) and a growing competitiveness by a third
country in main external markets (China in the case of East Asia, and Brazil,
after its devaluation of 1999, in the case of Argentina).
In both cases, the ratio between short-term external debt and reserves
increased: for instance, it grew from 0.99 in June 1994 to 1.45 in June 1997 in
Thailand and from 1.62 to 2.0 in South Korea; in Argentina, that ratio increased
from 1.32 in June 1994 to 1.60 in December 1998.
As regards to the speculative attacks, net private capital inflows in Asia-5,
according to data from the Institute of International Finance (which are
different from those from the IMF mentioned above), decreased from US$ 118.5
billion in 1996 to minus 37.3 billion in 1998. In Argentina, total net capital
inflows decreased slowly from US$ 29.1 billion in 1997 to 23.3 billion in 1998
and to 21.0 billion in 1999. But they amounted to US$ 12.6 billion in 2000 and to
minus 10.9 billion in 2001.
On the other hand, the differences were also important. The exchange rate
regime was obviously different, as the anchor was a hard peg in Argentina and
a soft peg in East Asia. Macroeconomic policy in the years preceding the crises
was also obviously different. In East Asia the inflation rates in the years
preceding the crises were low, so monetary policy was not particularly
restrictive. In Argentina, on the contrary, monetary policy was inevitably
restrictive, as the existence of the currency board precluded expansionary
measures.
The structure of capital inflows was very different. In East Asia, the bulk
was in the form of bank loans: in 1996 they amounted to 58% of private net
capital flows in Asia-5. In Argentina, portfolio investments, and, on a minor
proportion, also direct investments, made for the bulk of inflows. This was the
result of two features that were absent in East Asia: a large public debt and a
massive privatization process.
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Finally, external debt was mainly public in Argentina while it was mainly
private in East Asia.
As regards to the underlying process which led to the crises, the conclusions
seem to be clear. In East Asia, the trigger of the crisis was an excessive private
investment (financed by short-term financial debt) while in Argentina it was a
“pure” debt process, as a result of the massive capital inflow in form of
portfolio investments, mainly in government bonds.
6. Conclusions
The experience of Argentina during the 1990s, compared to that of the East
Asian countries which featured a crisis in 1997-98, might suggest, at first sight,
that currency pegs (both soft and hard) have several drawbacks. The negative
effects that have been highlighted in the preceding pages include: (1) currency
real appreciation and the ensuing worsening of the current account; and  (2)
massive foreign capital inflows in form of portfolio investment and bank loans,
that is, of debt-generating and/or volatile funds. Some specialists have
concluded that what is needed is an extreme version of the two-corners
approach, according to which only full dollarization or totally flexible exchange
rates are suitable.
Dollarization supporters point out that this is the only way to give
credibility to the exchange rate anchor. However, several theoretical and
empirical studies have clearly demonstrated that emerging economies are
highly vulnerable to important external shocks (such as changes in international
interest rates or in their terms of trade) and domestic shocks (such as changes in
their growth rates or in their employment levels), which call for some flexibility
in the exchange rate. If this flexibility is missing, adjustment to those shocks has
to be made through a costly price and wage deflation or through a difficult
increase of productivity respective to their trade partners. Moreover,
dollarization implies that the authorities renounce to all kind of autonomy in
their monetary policy.
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As regards to those defending totally flexible exchange rates, they do not
seem to take into account that the rates would be potentially very unstable, as
the intrinsic volatility in capital flows would lead to wide currency fluctuations.
Moreover, as emerging economies have to obtain debt denominated in foreign
currencies and they are unable to hedge against exchange risk (because of the
so-called “original sin”), a sudden depreciation would increase substantially the
value, in local currency, of their external debts. Therefore, the famous “fear of
floating” is to a certain extent justified in the case of emerging economies.
A second conclusion is that the main problem of exchange anchors is
related, not to the fact that they are more or less hard or soft, but instead to the
fact that they tend to be pegged to a single foreign currency. In East Asia the
peg was de facto, unofficial and soft, whereas officially there was a managed
float. Anyway, the appreciation of the US dollar since the spring of 1995 pulled
up the Asian currencies, especially in the case of Indonesia and Malaysia,
although not so much in the case of South Korea. It should be borne in mind
that Singapore, for instance, escaped relatively unscathed from the Asian crises,
despite its strong trade and financial links to other countries in Southeast Asia.
This might by explained by the linkage of its currency to a basket of currencies,
through a monitoring band arrangement. In the case of Argentina, it has been
convincingly suggested that “what made the Argentine currency board
ultimately unsustainable was not just that it involved a peg but that it involved
a peg to a strong dollar only” (Haussman and Velasco, 2002: 32). In fact, the peg
with only the US dollar made little sense in Argentina, whose external trade
was made mainly with Western Europe (an average of 24.3% of its total trade in
1992-98) and Brazil (23.1%) and only to a limited extent with the US (15.6%).
Therefore, emerging economies should explore diverse intermediate exchange-
rate regimes and especially those based on a peg to a weighted currency basket.
Finally, even with exchange rates pegged to an appropriate currency basket,
financial crises can also happen. What is needed is to complete an appropriate
exchange-rate regime with capital controls (Palma, 2000). Capital controls make
it possible to decrease the proportion of short-term funds in total capital
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inflows. The experience of the Chilean encaje (1991-98) has been illustrative..
Although some controversy still exists on the matter, this kind of control might:
(1) decrease the proportion of short-term capital flows in total capital flows as
well as help to control the growth of the latter; (2) avoid a substantial increase
in short-term foreign debt; (3) reduce or delay currency appreciation; (4)
maintain the independence in monetary policy without having to completely
flexibilize the exchange rate. The experience thus suggests that in emerging
economies the alternatives to capital controls are either a loss of autonomy in
monetary policy or an extreme volatility in the exchange rate.
In short, this paper has tried to point out that the comparative analysis of the
Asian crises and the Argentinean crisis strongly suggest that the mix of an
exchange rate anchor (either soft or hard) to a single foreign currency and a
quick financial liberalization is a combination full of pitfalls for emerging
economies. This mix contributes to increasing capital inflows, which in both
cases were massive in the years preceding their crises and which led, along with
the appreciation of the anchor currency, to an adverse currency real
appreciation and to an excessive growth of domestic credit. Moreover, as these
inflows were made in the form of debt-generating and/or volatile funds, the
result was that both the short-term external debt and the vulnerability to a
reversal in capital flows greatly increased. If the speculative, herding and panic-
prone behavior of international financial markets is added to the picture, all the
ingredients are met for a significant increase on the risk of suffering a financial
crisis.
Some measures might give emerging economies protection against this risk:
an exchange-rate regime based upon a basket of currencies and a financial
liberalization with a simultaneous creation of an adequate system of prudential
supervision and regulation of the financial system. However, unless substantial
progress is made in the construction of a new international financial
architecture, which seemed a promissory field some years ago but has
somewhat faded away, emerging economies will continue to be vulnerable to
the current framework of financial globalization. They should therefore
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apply all self-protection measures which are within their reach.
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